A. Countries
OECD countries account for 85% of the world's telecommunications revenues, 68% of the world's telephone main lines, and 83% of the world's gross domestic product (GDP). The five largest OECD telecommunications markets -(in order of size) Japan, the US, Germany, the UK, and France -make up 81% of the total OECD telecommunications revenues. The two largest OECD telecommunications markets -Japan and the US -make up 57% of the total OECD telecommunications revenues. 4 International telecommunications traffic patterns and locations of multinational corporations show a pattern that is similar to that of revenues, GDP, and telephone main lines. International traffic indicates the market size for international and multinational telecommunications service providers. The five largest markets for international traffic -(in order of size) the US, the UK, Germany, Canada, and France -account for 65% of the total outgoing telecommunications minutes for OECD countries.
5 (OECD, 1997, pp. 43, 49) Large numbers of multinational customers increase the importance of markets because these customers' demand for end-to-end services drive globalization of telecommunications businesses. 6 A recent study showed that 72% of all multinational corporations' headquarters are located in the US (30%), Japan (26%), Germany (8%), the UK (8%), and France (6%). 7 (Galbi States. (Source: http://www.oecd.org/about/member-countries.html, downloaded July 3, 1998.) Korea and Poland were not OECD members at the time this paper's OECD data were collected. 4 Telecommunications revenues are revenues for public switched telephone networks. OECD revenues were US$519.1 billion (OECD, 1997, p. 34) and world revenues were US$601.5 billion (International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 1997) in 1995. The five largest OECD markets were US$421.3 billion, and the two largest were US$297.6 billion. (OECD, 1997, p. 34 ) OECD main telephone lines were 470.4 million and world main telephone lines were 694 million in 1995. (OECD, 1997, p. 49 ) OECD GDP was US$20.9 trillion and world GDP was US$25.2 trillion in 1994. (World Bank, 1996, pp. 210-211) The OECD telecommunications revenue data and main telephone line data do not include Korea and Poland. The OECD GDP data do not include Iceland and Luxembourg. These data points were not available from the sources used for the other data.
5
Japan is conspicuously absent from this group. The OECD provides no explanation. It could be that the data were misreported, or that much of Japan's traffic was on dedicated lines that were not measured.
6
Section III explains the drivers of globalization in more detail. 7 Galbi and Keating explain that "(t)he share of multinational corporations is the share of the Fortune 1000 companies that are headquartered in the given country. The Fortune 1000 consists of the Fortune's Global 500, the 500 largest industrial companies, and Fortune's Global Service 500, a selection of the largest global companies in eight different service categories." (Galbi and Keating, 1996, p. 11) and Keating, 1996, p. 11) These same countries have 81% of all OECD telecommunications revenues.
Market size, incumbency of major telecommunications carriers (see Table 1 ), and numbers of multinational customers indicate that France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US are of strategic importance for global telecommunications companies. However, other countries are increasing in importance because of their growing telecommunications markets and economies.
Non-OECD (referred to as rest-of-world or ROW) increases in telephone lines and cellular subscribers indicate these markets' growth. Wireless's home country, but much of the company's operations are in non-OECD countries.
The third column shows each carrier's 1995 revenues in US dollars. The last column shows how these revenues relate to the world market. The five largest OECD telecommunications marketsJapan, the US, Germany, the UK, and France -are the homes for all but 5 of these 20 carriers.
These 20 carriers account for nearly 75% of the world's telecommunications revenues.
NTT, collecting 14% of the world's telecommunications revenues, is by far the largest carrier, exceeding the second largest, AT&T, by 60%. 8 The German carrier, Deutsche Telekom, is comparable in size to AT&T. From there, the company sizes fall off rather quickly. AT&T 8
The Japanese government is restructuring NTT into three companies that will be owned by a holding company. The government will own 60% of the holding company, NTT Corp. NTT Corp. will own all of the shares of the operating companies NTT East, NTT West, and NTT Long-distance and International Communications Company. (Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, 1998) Almost all of these carriers are traditional telephone companies; i.e., vertically integrated incumbents providing local and long distance services. The exceptions are the US carriers AT&T, MCI, and Sprint, and the Japanese carrier DDI Corp.
C. Alliances and Mergers
The major OECD carriers and other carriers are recombining into various alliances and mergers. It is futile to try to describe in a paper the state of affairs in these recombinations because they change on a regular basis. However, examining some of the major attempts and events provides insights into these businesses' futures.
There have been three primary global alliances --Concert, Global One, and World Partners --one of which (Concert) may already be over. 9 These alliances illustrate different approaches to globalization.
Concert and Global One are primarily equity relationships. In Concert, BT purchased a 20% stake in MCI and sought to purchase the rest. The Spanish carrier, Telefonica, joined Concert and engaged in an equity swap with Portugal Telecom, which was also a member of Concert. James Shaw explains that international mergers and acquisitions are more prone to failures than domestic recombinations. (Shaw, 1998, p. 141) The Global One business model appears to have worked so far, but it has not been without problems. On the plus side, each partner has been able to pursue its own business strategy.
Also, Global One has been winning large numbers of contracts with multinational customers.
On the minus side, management changes have been necessary at Global One and there have been concerns about a lack of profitability. Also, the merger trend in telecommunications has caused speculation about Sprint's future even though management has publicly disagreed with the speculation. 
Section II. Changes in Business Fundamentals
This section describes changes in the fundamentals of the telecommunications business and how these changes drive changes in business practices. The initial conditions that drove the traditional industry structure and arrangements are explained first. Then the emerging conditions and their effects on businesses are described.
The initial industry conditions -a combination of available technologies, government policies, and standard business processes in the late 1800s and early 1900s -tied geography, network, service provider, and service into a single identity to create a monopoly-dominated industry.
Voice telephone services' domination of telecommunications created the tie between network and service. technologies and the resulting networks provided voice calling between telephone customers.
The technical needs of voice services dominated these networks for the first 100 years of the industry. (Gabel, 1995, pp. 453-455) As a result, the technologies, networks, and services were integrally tied and virtually indistinguishable.
Traditional boundaries in telecommunications extended the tie to include company and market. There are two types of boundaries --geographic boundaries and company boundaries.
There are three types of geographic boundaries in telecommunications --exchange, jurisdictional (national, state, municipal), and, in the US, local access transport areas (LATAs).
Created by political and early technological considerations, these boundaries define services and markets even though customer needs and marketing seemingly played no role in their creation.
Technology limitations and government licensing caused the development of exchanges.
Exchanges established two distinct markets --local exchange and long distance. (Brock, 1981, pp. 96-97) Companies formed in conformance to the traditional industry boundaries. In most countries, the government formed a monopoly national carrier that was government owned. In other countries, a combination of local and national government-owned carriers formed along lines of local exchange, domestic long distance, and international long distance. (Jasinski, 1997, p. 130; Chavolla and Samarajiva, 1997, p. 149 
Section III. Changes in Business Strategy
The changes in business fundamentals create the need for business restructuring, but customer needs, competitive positioning, production, and government policies create the direction. This section describes customer needs, competitive positioning, and production.
Section IV describes government policies.
14 Total LEC revenues in 1993 were $95.5 billion. LEC long distance revenues in 1993 were $13.6 billion. LECs' $30 billion in access revenues are not counted as long distance revenues since they result from use of the local exchange networks. Access is a service that LECs provide to long distance service providers. This service allows long distance customers to make and receive calls over LEC local networks. Long distance providers use their networks to carry calls between local networks. LECs paid other LECs $1.3 billion in access expenses in 1993. Traditional long distance companies paid the remainder of the $30 billion of access. (United States Telephone Association, 1994, p. 9; and FCC, 1993, p. 31) 
A. Customer Needs
There are three types of customers whose telecommunications needs are driving telecommunications companies to become global: (1) Local customers whose needs are primarily network access and use, but may also be end-to-end in a limited area (examples include many local residential customers and small businesses); 16 (2) National and regional customers whose needs for multiple voice and data services are end-to-end nationally or regionally, but in a single country (examples would include some insurance companies and retail chain stores); and (3) Global or regional customers whose multiple voice and data service needs are end-to-end globally or in multiple countries regionally (examples would include multinational companies).
These customers drive globalization of telecommunications because of their local infrastructure needs and global networking needs.
These customers' infrastructure needs drive multinational investments in local infrastructure because of privatization of government service providers, granting of new operating licenses, and global rivalry. Privatization and new licenses drive multinational investment because serving pent-up demand for telecommunications in developing countries often requires capital and expertise that these countries do not have. (Hudson, 1997b, p. 197 Regional and global customers have networking needs that cross national boundaries, further driving companies to make multinational investments. (Jasinski, 1997, p . 137) Section I described the locations of corporate headquarters of the largest multinational firms. But these companies are only a sample of the many companies who operate in multiple nations.
Competing to serve these customers' needs requires domestic operations in countries where these 17 The long distance monopoly ended in 1996. (Chavolla and Samarajiva, 1997, p. 152) customers locate. Companies competing in this global business have three basic choices: (1) construct network facilities in the country; (2) interconnect with a competitor who already has the necessary facilities; and (3) join with domestic businesses to share network facilities.
Constructing facilities in a foreign country may be inefficient because regulatory barriers to entry and asymmetric information on domestic business practices place the foreign entrant at a competitive disadvantage relative to the domestic companies, and to companies that partner with the domestic companies. Interconnecting with a competitor may create strategic problems because the interconnection charges give the competitor influence over the entrant's cost structure. Also, the competitor's network quality and capability limit the entrant's service
capabilities. These problems lead many companies to choose the third option --join with domestic companies, even though this option also has problems, as Section I explained. 
B. Competitive Positioning and Production Economies
In addition to addressing customer needs, companies form global alliances and mergers for strategic reasons, such as to expand markets. (Shaw, 1998, p. 140; Oh, 1996, p. 714; and Gershon, 1997, pp. 6-9) This may take the form of using alliances to facilitate foreign market penetration or to simply expand market share. Foreign markets may be difficult to penetrate because of lack of market presence and asymmetric information on customer needs, local operating conditions, and government regulations. Allying with a domestic company may provide an established market position and domestic expertise.
Another factor affecting global alliances and mergers is the need for companies to position themselves for future markets. 18 As convergence continues to unfold, telecommunications companies will increasingly need to merge or partner with content providers, media companies, and computer companies. There will be numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements. (Shaw, 1998, p. 138) The interests here are much like the interests involved in current interconnection issues. A telecommunications company can increase its network's value by interconnecting with valuable content and information processing servers, or decrease its network's value through liberal interconnection with rival networks that have lower value. As a result, a telecommunications company's size and position in telecommunications is in part a preparation for bargaining with content providers, media companies, and computer companies. Market share may provide an advantage in these negotiations because size implies a greater customer base and may lead to greater technical and financial resources.
Expanding markets may provide increased production economies, stronger market presence, greater control over industry direction, and decreased competitive pressure. Increased production economies may come in the form of greater purchasing and distribution efficiencies, (Oh, 1996, p. 714) The previous discussion highlights many of the benefits for telecommunications companies participating in global alliances and mergers. However, there are also disadvantages. As has 18
Several authors have described and put numbers to the industries involved in this convergence. See, for example, Gershon (1997) , Shaw (1998) , Hudson (1997a), and Noll (1997) .
already been illustrated, these combinations have proven to be frail, so resources can be wasted negotiating and setting up a multinational operation that may be dismantled in a short time.
Also, partnerships and alliances may be tying the futures of companies whose interests and perspectives may be at odds at critical junctures, meaning that the whim of one of the companies may limit the futures of the others. (Shaw, 1998, p. 143 ) Also, agreeing to share profit reduces the incentive to increase total profit.
Section IV. Government Intervention
This section describes traditional government responses to telecommunications alliances and mergers, and examines the applicability of these responses for today's telecommunications markets. There are two parts. The first part explains why the global mergers and alliances should raise few competition policy issues, at least for the present. The second part describes institutional issues associated with implementing global competition policies.
A. Applicability of Competition Policy Issues
The most common reasons for government intervention in markets are monopoly and market power, externalities, information asymmetries between consumers and companies, distortions caused by other government policies, public goods, and distributive justice. (Jackson, 1997, pp. 186-198; and Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, 1995, pp. 2-3) In general, these reasons are weaker with respect to global telecommunications alliances and mergers than with respect to other situations. This is true because of multilateral rivalry, linkages and interdependencies, frailty of the recombinations, and information asymmetries.
Multilateral rivalry exists when diverse rivals compete in different market mixes. This market condition holds true in telecommunications because every company has its own market niche and a different strategy for addressing current and future market opportunities. This multilateral rivalry increases price pressures and decreases concerns with market power in two ways. First, companies may be forced to price below competitors' incremental costs in order to obtain and keep customers, and will generally be pressured to collect only limited contributions to common costs from each of their services. (Jamison, 1996, pp. 380-382) Global alliances and mergers may decrease problems with customer information asymmetries because known domestic companies are involved. 20 The involvement of domestic companies means that there are fewer language differences between company and customer, fewer misunderstandings relating to business practices, and greater common understanding of legal systems and contracts. These effects of involving domestic companies also decrease entry costs, which increase the probability of competitive entry in domestic markets.
B. Institutional Issues in Global Competition Policy
In addition to the economic issues with government intervention, there are institutional issues with enforcing competition policies. Governments effect their market interventions through government institutions, such as regulatory agencies, courts, and trade organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). An institution's leadership, processes, structure, authority, funding, and linkages with other institutions determine its appropriateness and effectiveness for intervening in markets. In some countries (a group that includes the US), political leadership influences the interpretation and enforcement of competition policies. (Shaw, 1998, p. 140) There are also situations where entrenched bureaucracies with their traditions and internal 19 Laffont, Rey, and Tirole researched the single market case and found situations where there may be collusive outcomes. (Laffont, Rey, and Tirole, 1998, p. 11) 20 Unfortunately, this may also carry with it unwanted baggage such as unfavorable reputation with at least some customers.
politics have significant influences on how competition policies are implemented, which does, of course, determine the real effects.
While leadership is important for keeping competition policies flexible and ruled by reason, the attributes of transparency, predictability, credibility, and legitimacy are also necessary.
These are necessary to: (1) allow the business planning that is necessary for corporations and private entrepreneurs to invest; and (2) ensure that the citizenry views the rules and their enforcement as fair. (Smith, 1997, pp. 25-27 ) As a result, institutional processes need to be rules-oriented and open to stakeholder participation. (Jackson, 1997, p. 190) Proper institutional authority is important to ensure that special interests do not overtake the institution, and to protect property. Oversight, checks and balances, and audits provide assurances that institutions do not abuse their discretion. Recent regulatory events underscore the importance of discretion. Regulators in the US, Australia, the UK, and Chile have begun adopting cost models for estimating costs for universal service and network prices. In the US, cost model decisions to date would not allow a company to cover even its forward-looking costs.
One of the US models requires regulators to make approximately 600 input assumptions. In the UK, cost model decisions led Oftel to conclude that British Telecom had no net universal service costs. In Chile, regulator estimates of forward-looking costs for electricity distribution are generally 50% below company estimates. Chile is unique in that prices are based on a weighted average of regulator and company estimates. This provides strong incentives for strategic calculations. (Jamison, 1997, p. 57; and Bitran and Serra, 1994, p. 180) In international settings, one of the primary competition policy needs is cooperation.
Cooperation is important for several reasons. Perhaps prompted by the prisoner's dilemma problem to pursue narrow agendas, individual governments and agencies may take actions that add up to disasters for the world. (Jackson, 1997, p. 189) 
Section V. Conclusion
This paper examines the business strategies and government policies affecting the formation of global telecommunications businesses. It reveals several areas of research that need to be followed.
One area of need is a more complete investigation into the business concerns that lead to formation of these global businesses. Research to date has been conjectural, so both theoretical and empirical studies are needed. Theoretical research should determine conditions under which choices to join or stay out of global alliances and mergers are Nash equilibria. Theoretical research is also needed for formal research into the business models the global businesses could use. The theoretical models could provide the bases for empirical studies that assess the relative importance of the factors affecting businesses' choices, the effects of changes in these factors, the effects of the alliances and mergers, and the factors that determine when to apply a particular business model. This research should also examine information asymmetries. For example, information asymmetries in interconnection negotiations, government regulation, and entry conditions may increase the efficiency of partnering relative to competing. On the other hand, information asymmetries in negotiating and managing a multinational business and in finding partners may decrease the efficiency of combining.
A more thorough comparison of competition laws is also needed. Legal comparisons of US and EU exist, but comparisons with other countries are difficult to find. Economic studies of the impacts of multiple competition laws is needed. These studies should examine whether countries can and do use competition laws to favor some companies over others, the economic effects of a proposed alliance or merger having to satisfy different jurisdictions' competition laws, and the effects the various legal processes have on the businesses.
A model of global rivalry is needed. This model should recognize that companies might be incumbents in some markets and entrants in others. It should also incorporate multilateral rivalry, as it appears likely that not all telecommunications businesses will be in all markets.
This model should incorporate the effects of multilateral bargaining of interconnection (including new media and computers), market entry, and product characteristics to see if the rivalry or oligopoly will be the norm.
This paper contends that competition concerns should be given less attention than they are in these alliances and mergers. While it is too soon to test this hypothesis in telecommunications, perhaps empirical research in other industries with similar characteristics could be undertaken to test the hypothesis.
Lastly, research is needed on the effective roles of multinational competition authorities and policies. Institutions such as the EU, the WTO, and other multinational treaty organizations are increasing their roles in competition policy. Empirical and theoretical guidance on the effects of this trend could help guide policy makers. At the time these data were collected, GTE only provided local services. It now also provides long distance services.
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Even though Sprint provides both local and long distance, regulation has kept the businesses separate.
